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Substance over Form  
CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.1 should have ended the long struggle by lower 
courts throughout the United States to determine whether 
corporations are subject to civil liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute (the ATS).2 The ATS provides U.S. courts with 
jurisdiction to hear civil cases brought by foreign plaintiffs for 
violations of “the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”3 Litigants often used the law to file claims in the U.S. 
against multinational corporations for allegedly aiding and 
abetting foreign governments in the commission of human 
rights violations,4 such as “genocide, extrajudicial killing, 
torture, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, and 
kidnap[p]ing.”5 In this regard, the ATS was a powerful tool. 
Courts, however, have inconsistently interpreted the 
scope of the ATS. In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit became the 
first federal appellate court to expressly articulate a basis for 
corporate liability under the ATS,6 and district courts 
throughout the country had already generally reached the 
same conclusion.7 But in the landmark 2010 decision, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit held that “the 
law of nations” does not recognize civil liability of corporations 
  
 1 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148-49 (2d Cir.), reh’g 
denied 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir.), 
petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 2326271 (June 6, 2011) (No. 10-1491), cert. granted, 132 
S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491), 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 2 See infra Parts III and IV. 
 3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS is also referred to as the Alien Tort 
Claims Act or the ATCA. 
 4 See infra Parts III and IV. 
 5 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 6 See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 7 Mara Theophila, Note, “Moral Monsters” Under the Bed: Holding 
Corporations Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Corp., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2881-82 (2011). 
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for human rights violations; therefore, plaintiffs are unable to 
bring ATS claims against corporations in U.S. courts.8 Although 
Kiobel significantly limited the scope of the ATS, other federal 
appellate courts subsequently issued contrary opinions, 
thereby maintaining the ATS as a potential path for civil 
liability claims against corporations. For example, in 2011, the 
D.C. Circuit held in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. that the ATS 
permits civil liability against corporations.9 Just three days 
after that decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber Co., reached a similar conclusion.10 Shortly 
thereafter, the Ninth Circuit similarly found in favor of 
corporate liability under the ATS in Sarei v. Rio Tinto.11 With 
Kiobel creating a Circuit split, the rulings in Exxon, Flomo, and 
Rio Tinto made the Second Circuit an outlier.  
However, given its prominent role in the history of ATS 
litigation, the Second Circuit’s ruling was significant and 
necessitated review by the Supreme Court.12 In June 2011, the 
Kiobel respondents filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,13 which 
the Court granted in October 2011.14 During the first round of oral 
argument, which addressed “whether corporations could be sued 
under [the ATS]”,15 the justices expressed concern about the lack of 
a U.S. nexus.16 In Kiobel, Nigerian plaintiffs brought suit against 
defendant corporations, incorporated in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, for alleged human rights violations that occurred 
in Nigeria. During arguments, Justice Alito asked, “What business 
does a case like that have in the courts of the United States?”17 In 
March 2012, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to file 
supplemental briefs on the extraterritorial application of the ATS; 
something that had not been considered by the courts below.18 The 
Supreme Court specifically requested further guidance on “whether 
  
 8 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148-49 (2d Cir.), reh’g 
en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir.), reh’g denied , 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2010), 
petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 2326271 (June 6, 2011) (No. 10-1491), cert. granted, 132 
S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491), 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 9 Exxon Mobile, 654 F.3d at 15; 
 10 See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 11 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 747-48, 764 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 12 See infra Parts I.B and IV. 
 13 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel, 2011 WL 2326271 (No. 10-1491). 
 14 See Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
 15 Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Orders Reargument in Alien Tort Statute 
Case, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/ 
2012/03/supreme-court-orders-reargument-in-alien-tort-statute-case.html. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
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and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows [U.S.] courts to 
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring” outside the United States.19  
The Court heard argument on the issue of 
extraterritoriality on the first day of the October 2012 term.20 
The Court contended with fifty supplemental amicus briefs 
filed on the issue;21 an amount that, when compared to the 
thirty-six amicus briefs filed on the issue of corporate liability, 
indicated the close attention paid to this facet of the case.22 On 
April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a much anticipated 
and long-awaited opinion. The Court unanimously upheld the 
Second Circuit ruling and denied the Nigerian petitioners 
access to U.S. federal courts under the ATS. Surprisingly,23 the 
Court based its decision on the presumption against the 
exterritorial application of statutes and did not address 
whether corporate liability is permitted under the ATS.24 
Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel severely 
restricts the applicability of the ATS to human rights violations 
committed abroad, the question of corporate liability under the 
ATS remains unanswered. This note argues that if and when 
lawsuits falling within the newly defined limits of the ATS are 
brought against corporations, U.S. courts should hold them 
accountable. In particular, this note finds that the courts 
adhering to the Kiobel line of jurisprudence mistakenly focus 
on the form of the perpetrator committing the human rights 
violations rather than the substance of the abuse. This results 
in a misinterpretation of international law, one that exempts 
corporations from civil liability under the ATS. 
  
 19 Louis M. Solomon, Extraterritoriality Becomes Focus of Kiobel Supreme Court; 
Are We Headed for Morrison II?, CADWALADER INT’L PRAC. LAW BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://blog.internationalpractice.org/international-practice/extraterrritoriality-becomes- 
focus-of-kiobel-supreme-court-are-we-headed-for-morrison-ii.html.  
  20 John Bellinger, Kiobel: Supplemental Briefs on Extraterritoriality Are In . . ., 
LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/kiobel-
supplemental-briefs-on-extraterritoriality-are-in/. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Stephanie Safdi, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights: Kiobel’s Call to 
Action, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:12 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
stephanie-safdi/kiobel-human-rights_b_3111575.html (“What is particularly striking about 
yesterday’s decision is that the question of extraterritorial applicability was never even an 
issue in the lower courts.”). 
 24 Kristin Linsley Myles, Kiobel Commentary: Answers . . . and More Questions, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary- 
kiobel-answers-and-more-questions/. 
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This note is divided into five parts. Part I focuses on the 
foundations of the ATS: the context in which the ATS was 
passed, the birth of ATS litigation, and an introduction to the 
law of nations. Part II highlights the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sosa, which shaped the modern framework of ATS lawsuits. This 
modern framework, however, has been inconsistently applied and 
Part III illustrates the need for further jurisprudential guidance. 
Part IV summarizes the line of jurisprudence espoused in Exxon, 
Flomo and Rio Tinto to demonstrate that the Second Circuit 
wrongly decided Kiobel. Lastly, Part V synthesizes and analyzes 
the various arguments made throughout the history of ATS 
litigation. This Part argues that the ATS supports claims of 
corporate liability and, derivatively, that the U.S. judiciary can 
be a forum that offers protection from human rights abuses. 
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Pursuant to the ATS, “district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”25 Thus, absent an alleged treaty violation, a 
plaintiff must allege a violation of the law of nations to invoke 
jurisdiction under the ATS.26 An understanding of “the law of 
nations” reveals the statute’s reach.  
A. The Law of Nations 
In Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court established a 
framework to determine what constitutes the “law of nations,” 
explaining: “[i]nternational law is part of our law, 
and . . . where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive 
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .”27 Of course, even 
with this working definition, determining “what offenses 
violate customary international law . . . is no simple task.”28 The 
Second Circuit has explained:  
Customary international law is discerned from myriad decisions 
made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas. 
  
 25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 26 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (“In sum, we think 
the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the 
courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject.”). 
 27 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  
 28 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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Furthermore, the relevant evidence of customary international law 
is widely dispersed and generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges. 
These difficulties are compounded by the fact that customary 
international law—as the term itself implies—is created by the 
general customs and practices of nations and therefore does not stem 
from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source. All of these 
characteristics give the body of customary international law a “soft, 
indeterminate character . . . .”29 
At the time the ATS was enacted, “the principal violations of 
customary international law were ‘piracy, mistreatment of 
ambassadors, and violation of safe conducts.’”30 Today, the law 
of nations is also violated by genocide, slavery, torture, 
prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic discrimination 
on the basis of race.31 
The law of nations, while often lauded for its humanitarian 
objectives, also raises concerns. Judge Posner explained: 
The concept of customary international law is disquieting in two 
respects. First, there is a problem of notice: a custom cannot be 
identified with the same confidence as a provision in a legally 
authoritative text, such as a statute or a treaty. (Modern common 
law doesn’t present that problem; it is a body of judge-created 
doctrine, not of amorphous custom.) Second, there is a problem of 
legitimacy—and for democratic countries it is a problem of 
democratic legitimacy. Customary international legal duties are 
imposed by the international community (ideally, though rarely—
given the diversity of the world’s 194 nations—by consensus), rather 
than by laws promulgated by the obligee’s local community.32 
It is important to take these concerns into account when 
determining the appropriate scope of the ATS.  
B. Historical Context of the ATS 
The First Congress of the United States passed the ATS 
“as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”33 There is little surviving 
legislative history regarding the ATS; it is generally believed, 
however, that the law was intended to assure foreign 
governments that the United States “would not tolerate flagrant 
violations of the ‘law of nations,’” especially breaches concerning 
  
 29 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995)). 
 30 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 (1987).  
 32 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016. 
 33 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING 
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 3 (2003). 
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diplomats and merchants.34 Records indicate that “two incidents of 
assault against foreign ambassadors on U.S. soil” motivated the 
United States, a burgeoning country at the time, “to display 
American leadership in defending international standards of good 
behavior.” 35 Recognizing the important role of the judiciary in 
foreign affairs, the First Congress promulgated the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 in order “to provide a federal forum to discharge the duty 
of the nation, to avoid potentially hostile state courts, and to 
promote uniform interpretation when dealing with violations of 
the law of nations.”36  
The ATS remained “dormant” for nearly 200 years37 
until 1978, when Filartiga v. Pena-Irala38 “ushered in the 
modern era of ATS litigation.”39 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit 
relied on ATS-based jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of two 
Paraguayan nationals against a former Paraguayan government 
official for alleged acts of torture and murder in violation of 
international law.40 In essence, Filartiga held  
that the ATS provides jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2) brought 
by aliens (only), (3) for violations of the law of nations (also called 
“customary international law”) including, as a general matter, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity—crimes in which the 
perpetrator can be called “hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.”41  
Prior to Filartiga, “the ATS was rarely invoked by 
plaintiffs.”42 The “general view” was that the ATS only provided 
power “to adjudicate violations of the law of nations as the term 
was understood in 1789” and other violations for which Congress 
  
 34 See id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction & Legal History 
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800, 06-4876). 
 37 Theophila, supra note 7, at 2864. The ATS was invoked twice shortly after 
its passage. Id. at 2863-64 (“First, in Bolchos v. Darrel, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of South Carolina assumed that the ATS provided a supplemental basis for 
jurisdiction over an admiralty suit for damages brought by a French privateer against 
a mortgagee of a British slave ship. Furthermore, in 1795, Attorney General William 
Bradford advised the State Department on whether American citizens who took part in 
the destruction of a British slave colony could be subject to criminal liability. Although 
Bradford expressed doubt regarding the citizens’ criminal culpability, he opined that a 
federal court would be willing to entertain the foreign plaintiffs’ civil liability under the 
ATS.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 38 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 39 Theophila, supra note 7, at 2864. 
 40 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 41 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 (footnote omitted) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878). 
 42 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 33, at 3. 
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“specifically create[d] additional causes of action.”43 In Filartiga 
however, the Second Circuit adopted a more “expansive” 
interpretation of the ATS, one that provided “jurisdiction over 
violations of international law in light of evolving jurisprudence.”44  
C. The Initial Surge and Early Litigation Under the ATS 
Since Filartiga, plaintiffs have filed hundreds of 
lawsuits claiming jurisdiction under the ATS.45 Initially, actions 
were brought under the ATS against individuals.46 In the 1990s, 
however, plaintiffs began bringing ATS suits against corporations 
conducting business in developing nations.47 “[F]rom 1996 to [2002], 
more than 100 ATS suits ha[d] been brought against American 
companies in connection with nondomestic operations.”48 This surge 
in litigation raised a number of concerns about the scope of the 
ATS, particularly among large multinational corporations facing 
potential liability.  
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas 
envision a “nightmare scenario” in which “100,000 class action 
Chinese plaintiffs” file suit against a collection of multinational 
corporations “in a federal court for abetting China’s denial of 
political rights, for observing China’s restrictions on trade 
unions, and for impairing the Chinese environment.”49 The 
authors surmise that the prospect of damages nearing $30 billion 
would force corporations into enormous settlements, and that 
corporations would “curtail their investments, not only in China 
but also in other (mainly developing) countries with less than 
perfect observance of individual and labor rights and 
shortcomings in the realm of political and environmental norms.”50 
  
 43 Id. at 3-4 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 44 Id. at 4. 
 45 See Lisa Ann T. Ruggiero et al., ATS Corporate Liability After Kiobel, 
LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/261968/ats-corporate-
liability-after-kiobel (“This seminal decision opened the floodgates for hundreds of 
lawsuits claiming jurisdiction via the ATS over the past 30 years.”). 
 46 See Frank Cruz-Alvarez & Laura E. Wade, The Second Circuit Correctly 
Interprets the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 111 (2011). 
 47 Ruggiero et al., supra note 45. 
 48 Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Burmese 
villagers filed suit in September 1997 against Unocal and their parent company, the 
Union Oil Company of California, under the ATS. The suit was filed for alleged human 
rights violations, including forced labor, in the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline 
project in Myanmar). 
 49 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 33, at 1. 
 50 Id. 
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The ultimate effect, they explain, would be a chill on international 
trade and the rise of a powerful anti-globalization force.51 
While perhaps hyperbole, Hufbauer and Mitrokostas’s 
“nightmare scenario” provides a helpful context for understanding 
the issues courts face when applying the ATS. Courts are tasked 
with providing adequate relief to plaintiffs without stymieing 
international commerce or hindering international relations.  
II. THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS 
Amid the flurry of litigation, the Supreme Court 
weighed in on the scope of the ATS for the first time in 2004.52 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court attempted to 
significantly restrict the scope of ATS jurisdiction, but it 
provided little guidance on the application of the law’s mandate. 
The respondent, Alvarez, had brought a claim under the ATS for 
arbitrary arrest and detention.53 Alvarez had been indicted in 
the United States for torturing and murdering a Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) officer.54 Unable to secure 
Alvarez’s extradition, the DEA paid Jose Francisco Sosa, a 
Mexican national, to kidnap Alvarez and to “bring him to the 
United States for trial.”55  
Once in the United States, Alvarez brought suit in the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 
claiming that he was illegally detained and his arrest by Sosa 
constituted a violation of the law of nations because the 
warrant only authorized his arrest in the United States.56 The 
district court “awarded summary judgment and $25,000 in 
damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim.”57 “A three-judge panel of 
the Ninth Circuit then affirmed the ATS judgment,”58 and, 
later, as they sat en banc to review, a divided court upheld the 
decision.59 The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that 
the ATS only provides a cause of action for violations of those 
international norms “defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of . . . 18th-century paradigms.”60 The Court found 
  
 51 Id. at 1-2. 
 52 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 53 Id. at 698. 
 54 Id. at 697-98. 
 55 Id. at 698. 
 56 Id. at 697. 
 57 Id. at 699. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 725. 
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that here, “a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed 
by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt 
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law 
so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.“61 
Adopting the Filartiga ruling, the Court rejected Sosa’s 
argument that the scope of international law violations cognizable 
in ATS litigation was limited to those recognized in 1789.62 The 
Court did, however, repeatedly emphasize the need for judicial 
caution in recognizing any new cause of action under the law of 
nations.63 The Court explained “that the door is still ajar subject 
to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of 
international norms today.”64 Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that lower courts should “require any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to [the modest number of violations 
recognized at the time the ATS was enacted].”65 The Court 
stated that its holding was consistent with the rulings of 
previous courts that had addressed the issue. For example, the 
Court highlighted the Filartiga court’s observation that, “for 
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the 
pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an 
enemy of all mankind.”66  
The Court explained that “the determination whether a 
norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should 
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment 
about the practical consequences of making that cause 
available to litigants in federal courts.”67 In footnote twenty of 
the opinion, the Court further posited that a “related 
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being 
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation 
or individual.”68 These two passages of dictum, referencing 
corporations only in a footnote, have been the focal points of 
prolonged debate69 over whether the ATS extends liability to 
  
 61 Id. at 738. 
 62 Id. at 712.  
 63 Id. at 725-28. 
 64 Id. at 729. 
 65 Id. at 724-25. 
 66 Id. at 732 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 67 Id. at 732-33 (footnote omitted). 
 68 Id. at 732 n.20. 
 69 See infra Part III.  
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corporations even though the text of the statute is silent on 
limits to the applicable class of defendants.  
III. THE COURTS STRUGGLE TO APPLY SOSA 
Despite the Supreme Court’s strong caution for “vigilant 
doorkeeping,” the lower courts’ inconsistent application of the 
Sosa precedent evidences its inability to provide adequate 
guidance. Some courts simply assumed sub silencio that 
corporations were subject to liability under the ATS, while others 
used a variety of principals from international law, domestic law, 
or a combination of both.70 Conversely, courts denying corporate 
liability under the ATS have consistently held that customary 
international law does not recognize civil liability for 
corporations and, thus, plaintiffs could not invoke jurisdiction 
under the ATS in U.S. courts for claims against corporations.71 
As a result, plaintiffs were left to pursue civil claims against 
corporations only where the alleged human rights violations 
occurred, often in developing countries.72 
A. The Calm Before the Storm—Courts Find Corporations 
Can Be Held Liable under the ATS  
1. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd. (2007) 
In Khulumani, foreign plaintiffs claimed that a group of 
corporate defendants had “actively and willingly collaborated 
with the government of South Africa” to sustain apartheid in 
violation of international law.73 The district court “held that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the 
[ATS]” and dismissed the lawsuit.74 Expressing fear about the 
potential chill on international commerce that holding corporations 
liable under the ATS could instill, the district court found that 
“customary international law” did not recognize causes of action for 
the plaintiffs’ claims.75 On appeal, two of the three judges joined to 
reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the ATS claim.76  
  
 70 Theophila, supra note 7, at 2880-81; infra Part III.A. 
 71 See infra Part III.B. 
 72 Ruggiero et al., supra note 45. 
 73 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007), 
aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008). 
 74 Id. at 259. 
 75 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay 
Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. 
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The Second Circuit in Khulumani interpreted Sosa as 
requiring a two-part inquiry.77 First, the court must determine 
“whether jurisdiction lies under the [ATS],” which requires a 
showing of a violation of the law of nations.78 The second 
inquiry “is whether to recognize a common-law cause of action 
to provide a remedy for the alleged violation of international 
law.”79 Each of the judges expressed a different view on the 
issue of corporate liability under the ATS pursuant to this test.  
Judge Katzmann applied international law to both parts 
of the inquiry. He first noted that, because the defendants did 
not raise the issue, the court was not required to address the 
question of whether corporations may be held liable for 
violations of customary international law.80 However, Judge 
Katzmann then observed that the Second Circuit has 
“repeatedly treated the issue of whether corporations may be 
held liable under the [ATS] as indistinguishable from the 
question of whether private individuals may be.”81 This is 
significant, because the Second Circuit already held in Kadic v. 
Karadzic that “certain activities are of ‘universal concern’ and 
therefore constitute violations of customary international law 
not only when they are committed by state actors, but also when 
they are committed by private individuals.”82 Further, while he 
approved the district court’s use of international law for the 
aiding and abetting analysis, Judge Katzmann nevertheless 
disagreed with its conclusion that international law does not 
recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting.83 
Conversely, Judge Hall reached the same result, but 
only applied international law to the first part of the inquiry 
regarding “whether jurisdiction lies under the [ATS],” and 
relied on federal common law to derive a standard for the 
aiding and abetting cause of action.84 According to Judge Hall, 
the standard for civil aiding and abetting should be derived 
  
Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008), remanded sub nom. In re South African Apartheid 
Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), motion to dismiss denied in part, No. 02 
MDL 1499 (SAS), 2009 WL 3364035 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009).  
 76 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. 
 77 Id. at 266 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 282-83. 
 81 Id. at 282. 
 82 Kadic v. Kardzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 83 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 268-69 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 84 See id. at 287-89 (Hall, J., concurring) (“I share Judge Katzmann’s 
understanding . . . that . . . corporate actors are subject to liability under the [ATS].”).  
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from section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
requires a mens rea of only of knowledge rather than purpose.85 
In dissent, Judge Korman focused on corporate liability under 
the ATS and found that international law does not recognize 
corporate liability.86 Thus, the claims should be dismissed 
under the first part of the inquiry for want of jurisdiction.87 
2. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy 
Inc. (2009) 
In this case, a group of Sudanese plaintiffs filed suit 
against Talisman Energy, Inc., claiming “that they [were] 
victims of human rights abuses committed by the Government 
of the Sudan” and that Talisman aided and abetted the 
Sudanese Government in committing these abuses.88 In district 
court, the plaintiffs claimed that Talisman violated customary 
international law relating to genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.89 Surprisingly, the Second Circuit did not 
discuss the substance of whether corporations can be held 
liable under the ATS.90 In fact, the court openly stated: 
We will . . . assume, without deciding, that corporations such as 
Talisman may be held liable for the violations of customary 
international law that plaintiffs allege. Because we hold that 
plaintiffs’ claims fail on other grounds, we need not reach, in this 
action, the question of ‘whether international law extends the scope 
of liability’ to corporations.91  
Instead, the court targeted the plaintiffs’ failure to meet their 
burden of proof on their claim of accessorial liability. The court 
officially adopted Circuit Judge Katzmann’s proposal in 
Khulumani and applied international law, holding that “under 
international law, a claimant must show that the defendant 
provided substantial assistance with the purpose of facilitating 
  
 85 Id. at 287-89. 
 86 Id. at 326 (Korman, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id.  
 88 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 89 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. 453 F. Supp. 
2d 633, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), judgment entered sub nom., No. 01-CV-9882-DLC, 2006 
WL 3469542 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 90 It is worth noting that the Second Circuit had, in the past, decided ATS 
cases involving corporations without addressing the issue of corporate liability. See, 
e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 241 (2d Cir. 2003) Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000)  
 91 Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d at 261 n.12 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)). 
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the alleged offenses.”92 The court found that the plaintiffs did 
not present evidence showing that Talisman purposely harmed 
them and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.93 
Illustrating the need to address the issue of corporate 
liability under the ATS, when the Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan filed a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, Talisman also filed a conditional cross-petition for a writ 
of certiorari demanding that the Court first determine whether 
federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS 
in order to impose liability on corporations for violations of 
customary international law.94 Despite the request for further 
guidance, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and left the 
issue unresolved.95  
3. Romero v. Drummond Co. (2008) 
In Romero v. Drummond Co., a Colombian labor union, 
its leaders, and relatives of its deceased leaders brought an 
ATS action in the Northern District of Alabama against the 
mining company Drummond.96 The plaintiffs alleged that, 
under the direction of corporate executives in the United States, 
the company “hired paramilitaries affiliated with the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia to torture” and assassinate union 
leaders.97 On appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants 
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the ATS did not allow suits against corporations.98 
The court supported its ruling that the ATS granted 
subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds.99 First, the court felt 
bound by its decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 
N.A., Inc.,100 which simply assumed that a corporate entity could 
be held liable without any discussion of the issue.101 Second, the 
court noted that the text of the ATS “provides no express 
exception for corporations.”102 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit 
  
 92 Id. at 247, 258. 
 93 Id. at 247-48. 
 94 See Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) (No. 09-1262). 
 95 Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 79 (mem.).  
 96 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 97 Id. at 1308-09. 
 98 Id. at 1315. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
 102 Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (citation omitted). 
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established corporate liability under the ATS and relied only on 
the court’s silence in past cases and the text of the statute 
without performing any substantive analysis of customary 
international law. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently cited 
Romero in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., to find that “corporate 
defendants are subject to liability under the ATS and may be 
liable for violations of the law of nations,”103 thus solidifying 
corporate liability under the ATS in the Eleventh Circuit.  
B. Changing Tides—Courts Find Corporations Cannot Be 
Held Liable Under the ATS 
Until 2010, not a single Circuit excused corporations 
from civil liability for violations of the law of nations under the 
ATS.104 In September 2010, however, three courts precluded 
“plaintiffs from asserting an ATS claim against any corporation 
within their jurisdictions.”105 These cases represented a sea 
change in the evolution of ATS litigation, and compelled 
subsequent courts finding in favor of ATS-based corporate 
liability to defend and propound their positions. 
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2010) 
In Kiobel, Nigerian residents claimed that oil 
corporations “aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
committing [human rights abuses].”106 Oil exploration and 
production companies had been operating in Nigeria and 
causing environmental damages since 1958.107 In response, local 
residents organized an opposition movement.108 The plaintiffs 
alleged that in 1993 some of these corporations obtained aid 
from the Nigerian government to quell the civilian opposition.109 
In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that for two years the 
Nigerian military: 
  
 103 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315), abrogated by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 
1702 (2012). 
 104 Theophila, supra note7, at 2892. 
 105 Id. (the Second Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California, and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.) 
 106 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).  
 107 Id. at 123. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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[S]hot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni villages—
beating, raping, and arresting residents and destroying or looting 
property—with the assistance of defendants. Specifically, the 
plaintiffs allege that defendants, inter alia, (1) provided 
transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be 
utilized as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers 
involved in the attacks, and (4) provided compensation to those 
soldiers.110 
Despite the apparent connection between the defendant, Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, and the serious allegations, the Second 
Circuit held that suits for violations of “the law of nations” 
under the ATS could not be initiated against corporations 
under the ATS.111 Following the directions of Sosa footnote 
twenty to consider the type of defendant, “[t]he Kiobel court 
held that because corporate liability is not a universal and 
well-defined norm of international law, federal courts do not 
have subject matter jurisdiction over corporations pursuant to 
the ATS.”112 In short, the Second Circuit “eliminated the most 
common type of ATS cases.”113 
The majority in Kiobel applied only international law to 
the analysis of “whether corporations can be subject to liability” 
under the ATS.114 Accordingly, the court “consider[ed] . . . the 
sources of international law [to] reveal . . . that those sources 
lead inescapably to the conclusion that the customary 
international law of human rights has not to date recognized 
liability for corporations that violate its norms.”115 Relying on 
the guidance for “authoritative . . . sources of international law 
identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice,”116 the majority focused on the following three bodies 
of law to determine that international law does not recognize 
corporate liability: (1) international tribunals, (2) international 
treaties, and (3) works of scholars.117 
First, in analyzing law from international tribunals, the 
court stated at the outset “that no international tribunal of 
which [it was] aware ha[d] ever held a corporation liable for a 
violation of the law of nations.”118 The court’s discussion began 
  
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 120. 
 112 Ruggiero et al., supra note 45 (emphasis added). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 125. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 132. 
 117 See id. at 132, 137, 145. 
 118 Id. at 132. 
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with an analysis of the Nuremberg Tribunal,119 which it 
considered “the single most important source of modern 
customary international law concerning liability for violations 
of fundamental human rights.”120 The court explained “that the 
London Charter, which established the [Nuremberg Tribunal], 
granted . . . jurisdiction over natural persons only.”121 The court 
based this finding on language from the London Charter 
“granting the tribunal jurisdiction to try and punish 
person . . . whether as individuals or as members of organizations 
. . . .”122 The court further noted that although the London Charter 
“granted the International Military Tribunal the authority to 
declare organizations ‘criminal,’” and, indeed, both the SS and 
the Gestapo were later indicted, the actual purpose “of 
declaring an organization criminal was merely to facilitate the 
prosecution of individuals who were members of the 
organization.”123 Lastly, the court observed that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal charged “[t]wenty-four executives of [IG] Farben,” a 
corporate entity intimately involved with the actions 
operations of the Nazi party, but did not charge or indict the 
corporation itself.124 The court found this history of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal to indicate that international law does not 
recognize corporate liability.125 Further, international tribunals 
since Nuremberg, such as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court, 
also limited jurisdiction to “natural persons.”126 Based on these 
findings, the Second Circuit found that past international 
tribunals’ treatment of corporate liability failed to establish 
that corporate civil liability is a recognized norm of customary 
international law.127 
Second, the court’s analysis of international treaties focused 
largely on rebutting the findings by the district court in Talisman 
  
 119 The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals for the 
prosecution of political, military, and economic leaders of Nazi Germany. The trials 
were held in Nuremburg, Germany by the allied forces of World War II. See STEPHAN 
LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE LAW CONFRONTS HARD CASES (2005).  
 120 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132-33. 
 121 Id. at 133. 
 122 Id. at 133-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (the 
London Charter) art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 288). 
 123 Id. at 134. 
 124 Id. at 134-35. 
 125 Id. at 143-46.  
 126 Id. at 136. 
 127 Id. at 137. 
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that the recognition of corporate liability in a vast number of 
treaties supports similar recognition by the law of nations.128 The 
majority rejected the finding, noting that although many “treaties 
suggest a trend towards imposing corporate liability in some 
special contexts, no trend is detectable outside such narrow 
applications in specialized treaties, and there is nothing to 
demonstrate that corporate liability has yet been recognized as a 
norm of the customary international law of human rights.”129 
Third, the majority examined scholarly work about 
corporate liability.130 It found that “most proponents of corporate 
liability under customary international law discuss the subject 
as merely a possibility or a goal, rather than an established 
norm of customary international law.”131 In sum, the majority 
did not find any basis in international law to recognize 
corporate civil liability for human rights violations. 
2. The Kiobel Line of Jurisprudence 
Although Kiobel was the first Circuit Court decision to 
expressly reject corporate liability under the ATS, both the 
Central District of California and the Southern District of 
Indiana almost simultaneously refused to extend civil liability 
to corporations in Doe v. Nestle, S.A.132 and Viera v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,133 respectively. Further, the Second Circuit followed its 
Kiobel decision several months later with Liu Bo Shan v. China 
Construction Bank Corp., where it applied Kiobel as precedent, 
thus signifying a commitment to its earlier ruling.134 
In Doe v. Nestle, S.A., Malian plaintiffs brought claims 
under the ATS, alleging that several international corporations 
aided and abetted their forced labor in cocoa fields in Cote 
D’Ivoire.135 The court dismissed the claim, finding that 
corporations are not subject to ATS liability and that “the 
extent that corporations should be liable . . . is a matter best 
left for Congress to decide.”136 In Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
Brazilian residents filed a complaint against “six U.S. 
  
 128 Id. at 138. 
 129 Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted). 
 130 Id. at 142. 
 131 Id. at 144 n.48. 
 132 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1126-28 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 133 No. 1:09-CV-0495-RLY-DML, 2010 WL 3893791, at *2-4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 
30, 2010). 
 134 Liu Bo Shan v. China Constr. Bank, 421 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 135 Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d. at 1064. 
 136 Id. at 1144. 
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corporations . . .[,] claiming to have suffered injury as a result 
of localized environmental pollution emanating from 
manufacturing sites located in [two Brazilian cities].”137 The 
court applied Kiobel’s reasoning and dismissed the ATS claims.138 
Similarly, Liu Bo Shan v. China Construction Bank Corp. 
involved an appeal by a former employee of the defendant 
corporation who claimed that the defendant fabricated charges 
against him after he released the results of a damaging audit 
report. The plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the fictitious 
charges, Chinese police tortured, beat, sexually assaulted, and 
arbitrarily detained him for a prolonged period of time. 
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found itself bound to the 
Kiobel precedent.139 These cases signified, at least initially, a 
broad acceptance of the Kiobel reasoning. 
IV. A NEW LINE OF JURISPRUDENCE EMERGES SUGGESTING 
KIOBEL WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
Although Kiobel may have snuffed ATS corporate 
liability in the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh 
Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit subsequently sided with the 
Eleventh Circuit, each finding that a corporation can be subject 
to liability under the ATS.140 Confronted by the Second Circuit’s 
bold opposition, the circuit courts in this line of jurisprudence 
bolstered the analysis in support of corporate liability under 
the ATS, which was rather haphazardly assumed pre-Kiobel. In 
particular, the alternative line of ATS jurisprudence recast pre-
existing interpretations of both Sosa and international law to 
show that the Second Circuit wrongly decided Kiobel. Despite 
the widening circuit split, the Supreme Court did not seize the 
opportunity to intervene on the issue of corporate liability 
under the ATS and ruled instead on other grounds. 
  
 137 Viera, 2010 WL 3893791, at *1. 
 138 Id. (finding the Second Circuit’s reasoning “persuasive”). 
 139 Liu Bo Shan, 421 F. App’x at 90-92. 
 140 Moreover, in Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., the Fourth Circuit heard oral argument 
on May 12, 2011 in which the plaintiffs alleged that an American chemical 
manufacturer sold a chemical used to manufacture mustard gas that was used by the 
Iraqi government forces against the Kurds living in northern Iraq. 658 F.3d 388, 390 
(4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit rendered its decision on September 19, 2011, 
finding “that the ATS imposes liability for aiding and abetting violations . . . but only if 
the attendant conduct is purposeful.” Id. However, the panel declined to consider the 
issue of corporate liability because plaintiffs “failed to plead facts sufficient to support 
the intent element of their ATS claims.” Id. 
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A. Judge Leval’s Kiobel Concurrence 
Although Judge Leval concurred with the Kiobel 
judgment, his lengthy analysis functions predominately as a 
dissent.141 Noting that “[t]he majority opinion deals a substantial 
blow to international law and its undertaking to protect 
fundamental human rights,”142 Judge Leval opined that 
corporations could be held liable for violations of the law of 
nations, but dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to 
state a legally cognizable claim.143 His concurrence provides a 
thorough critique of the majority opinion that has resonated in 
subsequent Circuit decisions.144 His opinion focuses on three 
points: (1) the majority’s ruling leads to illogical results in 
opposition to the objectives of international law, (2) the 
majority opinion fails to show that international law does not 
recognize civil liability for corporations, and (3) Sosa footnote 
twenty supports a finding for corporate liability under the ATS. 
1. Illogical Results in Opposition to the Objectives of 
International Law 
Judge Leval dissected the practical effect of the 
majority’s rule.145 The rule only provides relief for victims of a 
narrow class of atrocities “against the corporation’s employees, 
natural persons who acted in the corporation’s behalf, but not 
against the corporation that commanded the atrocities and 
earned profits by committing them.”146 As a result, corporations 
earning profits while committing human rights abuses are “free to 
retain those profits without liability.”147 Under the majority’s rule, 
he found that “[s]o long as they incorporate, . . . businesses will now 
be free to trade in or exploit slaves, employ mercenary armies to do 
dirty work for despots, perform genocides or operate torture prisons 
for a despot’s political opponents, or engage in piracy—all without 
civil liability to victims.”148 He concluded that such a “free pass to 
  
 141 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149-96 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). 
 142 Id. at 149. 
 143 Id. at 153. 
 144 See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 646 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th 
Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 145 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150-51 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 146 Id. at 151. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Id. at 150. 
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act in contravention of international law’s norms . . . conflicts with 
the humanitarian objectives of that body of law.”149 
2. No Proof that International Law Does Not Recognize 
Civil Liability for Corporations 
Judge Leval contended that the majority’s reliance on 
international tribunals to determine the reach of international 
law was misplaced.150 He noted that “international tribunals 
that have been established to date with jurisdiction over 
private persons have concerned themselves only with criminal 
punishment.”151 He demonstrated “the fallacy of the majority’s 
argument that the restriction of criminal punishments for 
violations of the law of nations to natural persons reflects an 
intention in international law to immunize juridical entities 
form civil compensatory liability”152 by highlighting the 
differences in criminal and civil law.153  
An “indispensable element to the justification of 
criminal punishment is criminal intent,” and thus, because a 
juridical entity cannot form such intent, “it is an anomaly to 
view a corporation as criminal.”154 Further, “criminal 
punishment does not achieve its principal objectives when it is 
imposed on” a corporation as opposed to a natural person.155 For 
example, criminal punishment seeks to inflict “punitive 
suffering” on the criminal in order to: (1) “give society the 
satisfaction of retribution,” (2) “disable the offender from 
further criminal conduct during imprisonment,” (3) “change a 
criminal’s conduct” by arousing a sense of “repentance,” and (4) 
“dissuade others . . . from criminal conduct.”156 Because a 
corporation has no soul, the benefits obtained from suffering 
are unavailing and imprisonment is clearly not an option.157  
Accordingly, the only punishment available is a monetary 
penalty that would tax the corporation’s owners, creditors, or 
  
 149 Id. at 155. 
 150 Id. at 163. 
 151 Id. (emphasis added). 
 152 Id. (emphasis added). 
 153 Id. at 166 (“The reasons why the jurisdiction of international criminal 
tribunals has been limited to the prosecution of natural persons, as opposed to juridical 
entities, relate to the nature and purposes of criminal punishment, and have no 
application to the very different nature and purposes of civil compensatory liability.”). 
 154 Id. at 166-67. 
 155 Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. at 168. 
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customers, but would “fail to hurt the persons who were 
responsible for the corporation’s misdeeds.”158 Thus, inflicting 
criminal punishment on a corporation accomplishes no penal 
objective.159 Conversely, “[a] principal objective of civil tort liability 
is to compensate victims of illegal conduct for the harms inflicted 
on them . . . .”160 Further, “[b]ecause the corporation, and not its 
personnel, earned the principal profits from the violation of the 
rights of others,” the corporation is the suitable entity to 
compensate those victims.161 
Further, international law provides the norms of 
conduct and prohibits certain acts such as genocide, torture, 
slavery and war crimes, but allows each state to make its own 
determination concerning civil liability.162 The ATS is the 
United States’ mechanism to enforce violations of international 
law through the imposition of civil liability.163 
3. Sosa Footnote Twenty Supports a Finding for 
Corporate Liability 
In contrast with the majority opinion, Judge Leval’s 
concurrence finds that footnote twenty of Justice Souter’s 
opinion in Sosa supports corporate liability rather than 
eliminates it.164 In considering “whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
the perpetrator being sued,” the majority’s interpretation 
suggests that courts should distinguish between natural persons 
who can be civilly liable and corporations who cannot.165 Judge 
Leval alternatively concluded that a contextual reading reveals 
“the passage [to] mean[] the contrary.”166 Footnote twenty refers 
to concerns, raised in the Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic167 
  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id.  
 160 Id. at 169. 
 161 Id. Judge Leval also notes “unlike the case with corporate criminal 
liability, which does not exist in many nations of the world, it is the worldwide practice 
to impose civil liability on corporations.” Id. 
 162 Id. at 172-73 (“While international institutions have occasionally been 
established to impose criminal punishments for egregious violations of international law, 
and treaties often impose on nations the obligation to punish criminal violations, the 
basic position of international law with respect to civil liability is that States may impose 
civil compensatory liability on offenders, or not, as they see fit.” (footnote omitted)).  
 163 Id. at 175. 
 164 Id. at 163-64. 
 165 Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 166 Id. at 164. 
 167 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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and Kadic v. Kardzic168 opinions, that certain conduct constitutes 
violations of the law of nations only when done independently of 
a State, “while other noxious conduct violates the law of nations 
regardless of whether done by a State or a private actor.”169 The 
appropriate distinction is between private and state action 
rather than distinctions among private actors, such as 
corporations and individuals.170 
B. Three Circuit Courts Find in Favor of Corporate 
Liability under the ATS 
Soon after the Second Circuit ruling in Kiobel was 
released, three circuit courts found in favor of corporate 
liability under the ATS. These opinions build upon arguments 
identified in Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence and justify the 
position that the Second Circuit was an outlier. In particular, 
the circuit courts upholding corporate liability under the ATS 
focus on the distinction between international law’s norms of 
conduct and the states’ enforcement of civil liability. 
International law identifies which acts are prohibited—e.g., 
genocide, slavery, war crimes, and piracy—while remedial 
actions are left up to the individual states—e.g., civil liability 
through the ATS for the United States. 
First, the D.C. Circuit found in favor of corporate 
liability in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., where Indonesian 
villagers alleged that members of the Indonesian military, 
hired by Exxon Mobil to guard a natural gas facility, committed 
“human rights abuses . . . includ[ing] genocide, extrajudicial 
killing, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, and 
kidnaping.”171 The court “recogniz[ed] that corporate liability 
differs fundamentally from the conduct-governing norms at issue 
in Sosa, and consequently customary international law does not 
  
 168 Kadic v. Kardzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1996) 
 169 Id. at 165. 
 170 Id. (“Far from implying that natural persons and corporations are treated 
differently for purposes of civil liability under ATS, the intended inference of the 
footnote is that they are treated identically. If the violated norm is one that 
international law applies only against States, then ‘a private actor, such as a 
corporation or an individual,’ who acts independently of a State, can have no liability 
for a violation of the law of nations because there has been no violation of the law of 
nations. On the other hand, if the conduct is of the type classified as a violation of the 
norms of international law regardless of whether done by a State or a private actor, 
then ‘a private actor such as a corporation or an individual,’ has violated the law of 
nations and is subject to liability in a suit under the ATS.”).  
 171 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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provide the rule of decision.”172 Judge Rogers, writing for the 
majority, explained that Sosa provides that customary 
international law should inform the substantive causes of action 
in ATS cases. “[F]ederal courts,” however, “must determine the 
nature of any remedy in lawsuits alleging violations of the law of 
nations by reference to federal common law . . . .”173  
Next, the Seventh Circuit harped on the distinction 
between norms of conduct and enforcement in order to hold 
corporations liable under the ATS. In Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber Co., twenty-three Liberian children charged 
Firestone with utilizing “hazardous child labor” on a rubber 
plantation in Liberia in contravention of customary international 
law.174 Although the court ultimately dismissed the claim on 
grounds that the asserted child labor did not violate customary 
international law, the court indicated that corporations could be 
held liable under the ATS.175 Analogous to the D.C. Circuit 
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit “underscore[d] the distinction 
between a principle of law, which is a matter of substance, and 
the means of enforcing it, which is a matter of procedure or 
remedy. . . . International law imposes substantive obligations 
and the individual nations decide how to enforce them.”176 
Lastly, seven out of the eleven Ninth Circuit judges 
sided with Judge Leval’s concurrence in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, which was a suit brought against the Rio Tinto mining 
company for its alleged role in genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and racial discrimination against residents 
of the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea.177 Again, the 
majority homed in on the distinction between the customary 
norms identified by international law and the enforcement 
  
 172 Id. at 41. 
 173 Id. at 41-42 (“That the ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct 
at issue fits a norm qualifying under Sosa implies that for purposes of affording a 
remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the law of nations must provide 
the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit.”). The court also noted “[o]ur conclusion differs 
from that of the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., because its 
analysis conflates the norms of conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules for any remedy to 
be found in federal common law at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis 
misinterprets the import of footnote 20 in Sosa . . . .” Id. at 41 (citation omitted).  
 174 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 175 Id. at 1025. 
 176 Id. at 1019-20 (citation omitted). 
 177 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 742-44, 747 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 153 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491)), vacated, Rio 
Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 2013 WL 1704704 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2013).  
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through civil actions provided by domestic law.178 Thus, the 
clear distinction between norms and enforcement proved to be 
a compelling argument. 
C. The Supreme Court Abstains from Weighing In 
Confronted by the lower courts’ inconsistent rulings 
concerning corporate liability under the ATS, the Supreme 
Court granted cert in Kiobel to settle the issue.179 
Unfortunately, the Court found ground to rule elsewhere and 
decidedly left the issue open.180 Pursuant to a canon of statutory 
interpretation called the “presumption against extraterritorial 
application,” the Court held that the ATS did not confer subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case, and thus eliminated the 
petitioners’ access to U.S. courts.181 
The presumption against extraterritorial application 
“provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.’”182 The Court found 
that “nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption” and 
because “all relevant conduct took place outside the United 
States,” the petitioners could not pursue their claim.183 The 
Court noted that “even where the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the Unites States, they must do so with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”184 The Court, however, did not define “sufficient 
force.”185 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the narrow holding in 
Kiobel where the petitioner, respondent, and all relevant 
conduct were foreign and thus the opinion left open “a number 
of significant questions.”186 He explained that where a lawsuit’s 
key elements bear a closer U.S. nexus, “proper implementation 
  
 178 Id. at 748; see also id. at 770 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“Domestic law 
therefore governs how international norms are enforced under the ATS.”). 
 179 See supra Introduction.  
 180 See id.  
 181 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 182 Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2878 (2010)). 
 183 Id. at 1669. 
 184 Id.  
 185 See id. Justice Alito wrote in his concurrence that sufficient force to rebut 
the presumption against extraterritoriality exists only where “the domestic conduct is 
sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of 
definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.” Id. (Alito, J. concurring) 
(emphasis added).  
 186 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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of the presumption against extraterritorial application may 
require some further elaboration and explanation.”187 
In contrast, Justice Breyer agreed with the holding 
because the allegations in Kiobel “lack[ed] sufficient ties” to the 
United States, but disagreed with applying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.188 Justice Breyer found that the ATS 
could apply where:  
(1) the alleged conduct occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is 
an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially 
and adversely affects an important American national interest, and 
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from 
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a 
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.189 
Although not directly addressing the issue of corporate 
liability, Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, indicated that 
“[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would 
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”190 
Given that the term “presence” was not defined, it is likely that 
plaintiffs “domiciled or headquartered in the United States 
remain fair game in ATS suits, even if those suits challenge 
purely extraterritorial conduct by the corporations or their 
subsidiaries.”191 Should a court find that being domiciled or 
headquartered in the U.S. has “sufficient force” to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, a determination of 
corporate liability under the ATS would be necessary. 
V. CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT RULED INCORRECTLY 
The three consecutive findings in favor of corporate 
liability under the ATS by circuit courts—all of which reiterated 
a consistent doctrinal approach supported by law, logic, and 
policy—suggest that the Second Circuit’s ruling in Kiobel was 
an outlier. The Second Circuit misinterpreted precedent and 
defied the objectives of international law in order to support an 
unsubstantiated policy agenda that insulates corporations from 
liability. The rationale espoused by Judge Leval’s Kiobel 
  
 187 Id.  
 188 Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. at 1669 (majority opinion). One might argue that this language represents 
an implicit acknowledgment of corporate liability under the ATS by the Court. 
 191 Myles, supra note 24 (emphasis added). 
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concurrence, and adopted and enhanced by the subsequent 
Circuit Courts, recognized the flawed analysis lingering in the 
Second Circuit.  
A. The Kiobel Majority Opinion Begs for Review 
At the outset, two early passages in the Kiobel majority 
opinion reveal Judge Cabranes’s ulterior motives and his own 
reservations about the decision. First, Judge Cabranes 
describes a muddled jurisprudential environment, one backed 
by strong economic incentives to soften the blow of his decision: 
Such civil lawsuits, alleging heinous crimes condemned by 
customary international law, often involve a variety of issues unique 
to ATS litigation, not least the fact that the events took place abroad 
and in troubled or chaotic circumstances. The resulting complexity 
and uncertainty—combined with the fact that juries hearing ATS 
claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts—has led 
many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial. Thus, our Court 
has published only nine significant decisions on the ATS since 1980 
(seven of the nine coming in the last decade), and the Supreme Court 
in its entire history has decided only one ATS case.192 
The combination of “complexity and uncertainty” with the 
threat of large settlements is not a reason to create precedent 
that defies the objectives of international law and that 
promotes corporate profit over the ability of victims of human 
rights abuses to obtain redress. Further, Judge Cabranes closes 
his introduction, stating, “we are confident that if our effort is 
misguided, higher judicial authority is available to tell us so.”193 
Such words suggest a court that is begging for review by the 
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not 
take advantage of its opportunity to tell the Second Circuit that 
its “effort [was] misguided.”194 
B. Misapplication of International Law 
The essence of the majority opinion in Kiobel is that 
Sosa’s footnote twenty commands lower courts to make a 
determination as to whether the type of defendant—individual, 
corporation, or state—can be liable for violations of international 
law.195 Then, by looking at sources of international law, the 
  
 192 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116-17 (footnotes omitted). 
 193 Id. at 123. 
 194 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 195 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128. 
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majority instructs lower courts to see if liability for that type of 
defendant has become a specific, universal, and obligatory 
norm of international law.196 In espousing such a construct, the 
majority opinion incorrectly focuses on the form of the 
defendant rather than the substance of the violation. As a 
result, it misinterprets binding precedent and establishes a 
framework that is misaligned with the goals of international 
law. Further, the Kiobel majority fails to pass its own test, 
drawing erroneous conclusions from incorrect sources. 
1. Incorrect Focus on the Form of the Defendant Rather 
than the Substance of the Violation  
In Sosa, the Supreme Court assumed that the First 
Congress’s intent in enacting the ATS was to provide redress for 
conduct “threatening serious consequences in international 
affairs”197—e.g., infringements of ambassadorial rights and 
piracy.198 The Court’s application of this standard to Alvarez-
Machain’s claim emphasized the substance of the conduct rather 
than the form of the perpetrator. The Court focused on whether 
“a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the 
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt 
arraignment . . .” violated customary international law,199 thereby 
centering the crux of its debate on what type of conduct fit within 
the class so heinous as to be protected by the law of nations. 
Looking towards the end of Sosa footnote twenty, which 
considers “whether international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being 
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation 
or individual,”200 the Court “compare[s] Tel-Oren (insufficient 
consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates 
international law), with Kadic (sufficient consensus in 1995 
that genocide by private actors violates international law).”201 
This citation suggests that Sosa’s footnote twenty does not 
stand for the proposition that corporations are not liable for 
violations of international law. Rather, it simply implies that a 
finding of an international law violation is dependent upon the 
actor—when committed by a state actor as opposed to a non-state 
  
 196 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 197 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004). 
 198 See id. 
 199 Id. at 738. 
 200 Id. at 732 n.20. 
 201 Id. (citations omitted). 
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actor, “such as a corporation or individual.”202 The Court 
emphasized the distinction between “private,” non-state actors, 
and “public,” state actors. And, as argued in a Kiobel amicus brief, 
“certain egregious conduct violates international human rights 
standards, whether committed by State or non-State actors.”203  
The Second Circuit Kiobel majority opinion exhibited a 
“[f]ailure [t]o [u]nderstand ‘[n]orms’ as ‘[s]tandards of 
[c]onduct.’”204 The majority incorrectly asked whether it was a 
“norm” for corporations to be prosecuted for violations of human 
rights.205 This reasoning, however, misses the point that certain 
types of conduct, such as genocide, torture, and slavery, fall 
within a class of activity so heinous that it is proscribed by 
international law.  
By misinterpreting footnote twenty and placing an 
emphasis on the form of the defendant, the majority’s efforts were 
misguided. In an attempt to determine whether international law 
recognizes civil liability for corporations at all, the majority asks 
the wrong questions and gets the wrong answers206 because  
it is wrong to conclude from the alleged absence of human rights 
cases against corporations that they are exempt from human rights 
norms. International law never defines the means of its domestic 
implementation, leaving sovereign States a wide berth in assuring 
that the law is respected and enforced in accordance with its own 
law and traditions.207  
Highlighting the flaw in this line of reasoning, Judge Posner 
makes the point in Flomo: 
If a plaintiff had to show that civil liability for such violations was 
itself a norm of international law, no claims under the Alien Tort 
  
 202 Id. 
 203 Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners 
at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter International 
Law Scholars Brief]. 
 204 Theophila, supra note 7, at 2902. 
 205 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). 
 206 See International Law Scholars Brief, supra note 203, at 2-3 (“The majority 
below reached its conclusion only by looking for the wrong kinds of evidence of 
international law, inferring from the absence of cases imposing corporate civil liability 
for human rights violations that no norm imposes or allows such liability. That 
technique betrays a basic misunderstanding of international law and this Court’s 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain . . . . The Kiobel court’s methodological error has 
substantive consequences and leads the panel to miss the consistent principles of 
international law that recognize corporate liability and the obligation of States to 
provide a meaningful remedy for all violations of human rights, no matter who or what 
violates them.” (citation omitted)). 
 207 Id. at 4-5. 
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Statue could ever be successful, even claims against individuals; only 
the United States, as far as we know, has a statute that provides a 
civil remedy for violations of customary international law.208 
International law focuses on determining what conduct violates 
the law of nations.  
That international criminal tribunals such as the one at 
Nuremberg were given the authority to adjudicate and enforce 
penalties for criminal conduct does not mean that civil remedies 
for the same conduct do not, or should not, exist. With the ATS, 
“the First Congress of the United States exercised the sovereign 
discretion protected by international law by empowering the 
federal courts to hear aliens’ civil actions for those violations of 
international law that take tortious form . . . without specifying 
the types of defendants who might be sued.”209 
2. Erroneous Conclusions Drawn From Incorrect 
Sources 
“Although . . . international criminal tribunals distinguish 
between natural and juristic persons for purpose of criminal 
liability . . . , [n]othing in international law . . . precludes the 
imposition of civil or tort liability for corporate misconduct . . . .”210 
As Judge Leval made abundantly clear, there are numerous 
reasons why corporations are not charged with criminal 
liability.211 Thus, it is improper to draw the conclusion from the 
lack of available criminal charges that corporations are not 
similarly subject to civil charges. Ambassador David J. Scheffer 
further explained the absence of liability for corporations with his 
observations regarding the legislative history of the Rome Statute 
which established the International Criminal Court. During the 
drafting of the law, negotiators: 1) intentionally excluded 
corporations from criminal liability for practical considerations 
  
 208 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011) 
 209 International Law Scholars Brief, supra note 203, at 6 (emphasis added); 
see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. Casto et al. in 
Support of Petitioners at 8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (No. 10-1491) (“The 
text of the ATS reflects congressional intent to provide aliens a civil remedy for 
violations of the law of nations. The ATS restricts the jurisdiction to causes arising 
under ‘the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’ where the plaintiff is ‘an 
alien.’ While the text of the ATS specifies what conduct comes within its reach 
(violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States), it expressly does not 
limit suits against any class of defendant, including corporations. Had Congress 
intended to exempt particular defendants from ATS suits, it would have done so 
explicitly.” (citations omitted)). 
 210 International Law Scholars Brief, supra note 203, at 7-8.  
 211 See supra Part IV.A.2.  
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having nothing to do with customary international law, and 2) 
deliberately avoided the issue of civil liability for tort actions by 
multinational corporations because civil claims were beyond the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.212 
The Court in Sosa recognized that the ATS relies on the 
juxtaposition of international law and domestic common law. 
International law defines customary norms of regulated conduct, 
while domestic common law governs enforcement of tort 
remedy.213 The First Congress must have expected domestic 
common law to govern secondary matters in order to give the 
statute practical effect “because internationally constituted 
tribunals did not exist when the ATS was adopted.”214 
International law is used to establish substantive norms and 
domestic law provides the remedy for their violation.215  
By misinterpreting the meaning of Sosa footnote twenty, 
the Second Circuit Kiobel majority “conflate[s] the jurisdictional 
and cause of action aspects of an ATS suit.”216 In civil actions 
under the ATS: the ATS provides subject matter jurisdiction, the 
law of nations (or treaty law) determines the substantive norms, 
and domestic federal common law provides the cause of action.217 
Once the federal courts are provided with jurisdiction via a breach 
  
 212 Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University School of 
Law at 2-3, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel, 
(No. 10-1491) (“The negotiators’ decision . . . to exclude corporations had nothing to do 
with customary international law and everything to do with a complex and diverse 
application of criminal (as opposed to civil) liability for corporate conduct in domestic 
legal systems around the globe. Given that diversity, it was neither possible to 
negotiate a new standard of criminal liability with universal application in the time 
frame permitted . . . , nor plausible to foresee implementation . . . when confronted with 
such differences in criminal liability for juridical persons. Additionally, the 
negotiations . . . steered clear of civil liability for tort actions by multinational 
corporations because civil liability falls outside of the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court. Thus, no conclusion can be drawn . . . that would preclude national 
courts from holding corporations liable in civil damages for torts committed on national 
or foreign territory.”). 
 213 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“The jurisdictional 
grant [the ATS established] is best read as having been enacted on the understanding 
that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of 
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”). 
 214 Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History Barbara Aronstein Black 
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 12, Kiobel, (No. 10-1491).  
 215 See Andre Nollkaemper, Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts, 
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 795 (2007) (“Since international law determines only general 
principles, leaves much of the detail of the fashioning of relief to the domestic level, and 
relies on domestic law to supplement it with necessary detail and to adjust it to the 
domestic context, different states will inevitably come up with different responses.”). 
 216 Odette Murray et al., Exaggerated Rumours of the Death of an Alien Tort? 
Corporations, Human Rights and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 
57, 75 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
 217 Id. 
2013] SUBSTANCE OVER FORM 1583 
of a customary norm as defined by international law, the issue of 
corporate liability is governed by domestic federal common law. It 
would be naive to expect international law to define universally 
accepted rules on “standards of proof, rules of evidence, theories of 
vicarious liability and doctrines of veil piercing, agency, respondeat 
superior, proof of causation and calculation of damages.”218 
International law leaves such causes of action to the domestic law 
of each state.219 The issue of corporate liability is not a norm of 
conduct, but rather a method of allocating losses to corporate 
principals for agents’ torts and is thus governed by domestic 
federal common law.220 It should come as no surprise that U.S. 
federal common law has a longstanding tradition of holding 
corporations civilly liable.221 Therefore, it is only proper that 
corporations are likewise liable under the ATS.  
C. Denial of Corporate ATS Liability Feels Wrong 
If states and private persons can be found liable for 
violating the law of nations, why should corporations be exempt? 
A failure to hold corporations accountable for their actions not 
only defies logic, but also undermines the effectiveness of 
international law in achieving its goals. 
Judge Weinstein best summarized the argument on 
principles of fairness and logic in In re Agent Orange Product 
Liability Litigation, a case brought by Vietnamese nationals 
against U.S.-based corporations that provided the U.S. 
government with the Agent Orange that was sprayed over 
Vietnam from 1961 to 1975.222 Judge Weinstein wrote: 
Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the 
corporation directing the individual’s action through its complex 
operations and changing personnel makes little sense in today’s 
world. Our vital private activities are conducted primarily under 
corporate auspices, only corporations have the wherewithal to 
respond to massive toxic tort suits, and changing personnel means 
that those individuals who acted on behalf of the corporation and for 
  
 218 Id. at 78-79. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History Barbara Aronstein Black 
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2-3, Kiobel, (No. 10-1491). 
 221 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Supporting Petitioners at 25, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1491). 
 222 Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
Litig.), 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims 
of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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its profit are often gone or deceased before they or the corporation 
can be brought to justice.223 
The notion that corporations are not subject to the same 
liability as people are under the ATS is particularly perplexing 
in light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in 
which the Supreme Court held that corporations have the same 
First Amendment right to fund political speech as natural 
persons.224 One would think that with rights come responsibilities. 
The Second Circuit majority in Kiobel provides no 
compelling reason for abandoning a fundamental goal of 
international law: to provide the protections for citizens around the 
world from heinous atrocities.225 The majority opinion alludes to the 
fact that corporations face potential liability for large settlements 
or court sanctioned damages,226 but it fails to elaborate on any type 
of economic catastrophe that could possibly warrant a denial of 
human rights protections, if one is even possible. In Flomo, Judge 
Posner makes the valid point that “[b]usinesses in countries that 
have and enforce laws against child labor are hurt by competition 
from businesses that employ child labor in countries in which 
employing children is condoned.”227 If bona fide businesses are 
adversely affected with or without civil liability from the ATS, a 
decision based on policy considerations should support a system 
that provides the greatest protections for human rights under 
international law.  
In addition, there are two protections that mitigate 
against the “nightmare scenario” offered by Hufbauer and 
Mitrokostas.228 First, Sosa already provides “that the door is 
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a 
narrow class of international norms today.”229 Thus, by “vigilant 
doorkeeping,” the courts are instructed to limit conduct that 
gives rise to jurisdiction under the ATS. Sosa explains that this 
process requires “an element of judgment about the practical 
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the 
federal courts.” Under the current framework, it is possible for 
  
 223 Id. at 58 (citation omitted). 
 224 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010). 
 225 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 154-55 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491) 
(describing the shift in the focus of international law post World War II towards 
humanitarian objectives and identifying repugnant acts that should be condemned by 
international law). 
 226 Id. at 116-17.  
 227 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 228 See supra Part I.C. 
 229 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
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courts to limit the type of conduct giving rise to jurisdiction under 
the ATS on policy considerations without completely eliminating 
civil liability for corporations. Second, while the standard is not yet 
settled, a stringent requirement for aiding and abetting can 
significantly limit the scope of corporate liability. For example, 
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani concluded that 
aiding and abetting requires a mens rea of purpose and an actus 
reus of “substantial assistance.”230 Thus, corporations conducting 
bona fide operations in high-risk nations would be protected from 
frivolous lawsuits. Only if their actions and intent show a clear 
connection to the human rights abuses would they be subject to 
civil liability under the ATS. There is ample room for the law to 
protect international commerce and human rights simultaneously.  
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel derailed a long 
history in our nation’s court system protecting victims of human 
rights violations. The Court based its decision on a misapplication 
of international law in support of unsubstantiated policy 
considerations. It misinterpreted Sosa to instruct lower courts to 
determine whether international law recognizes liability for the 
form of the defendant rather than the substance of the conduct, 
and defied the objectives of international law in doing so. Further, 
the Kiobel decision fails because the court reaches its conclusion 
through an investigation of international criminal law, which 
sheds little if any light on the issue of civil liability. The Supreme 
Court’s refusal to settle the issue of corporate liability under the 
ATS is unfortunate. But, to the extent future ATS cases are 
brought against corporations, courts should follow the line of 
jurisprudence coming out of the circuit court decisions issued 
subsequent to Kiobel that largely adopt Judge Leval’s concurrence.  
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